|   Northern Ireland Independence Alan - I recall now that you mentioned independence in respect of an article 
        byPaul Fitzimmons. Can't recall what publication the article came from, 
        but I
 think you indicated that both sides of the religious divide here were
 willing to give Paul's ideas a fair hearing.
 Out of interest, I've just come across a similar article by Paul. It 
        may beof interest to those who are active in debating the proposed booklet on
 unionism v. independence.
 Paul's article is from a magazine called 'The Other View' and it's producedby ex-loyalist and republican paramilitaries. I've been in touch with 
        Paul
 and he's very interested in getting feedback on his ideas. His e-mail
 address is at the end of the article.
 Most folks who advocate independence come from a Protestant background, 
        soit's interesting to read the views of a Catholic Irish-American, who is 
        a
 member of the US Republican Party.
 All the best. Article to follow. - John. Northern Ireland Independence - by Paul A. Fitzsimmons. As an Irish-American Republican who attended QUB's Faculty of Law in 
        themid-1980's, I was pleased to receive an invitation from The Other View 
        to
 address a topic which has been a subject of considerable study for me: 
        the
 possibility of a fair and workable six-county independence, should
 conventional "peace process" approaches continue to fail as, 
        of course, they
 've long done.
 Obviously, the overall thought underlying possible independence is that 
        - iflogistically feasible - immediate "freedom" from London at the 
        cost of
 permanent "freedom" from Dublin might be an acceptable exchange 
        for Northern
 Catholics generally, as might be the exact converse for Northern Protestants
 generally.
 Such acceptance is not inconceivable. An April 1997 Belfast Telegraph/QUBopinion poll showed that roughly half of each of Northern Ireland's
 Protestant and Catholic communities would at least "tolerate" 
        a settlement
 involving independence, and that poll was of course taken without any 
        actual
 independence plan to evaluate.
 A framework for independence would need to include the following elements:(i) a dual citizenship option for any in Northern Ireland - and any of 
        their
 progeny - so desiring it; (ii) a basic form of government which would 
        afford
 Northern Catholics a genuine opportunity for political participation (this
 can indeed be done); (iii) constitutionally established individual and 
        civic
 rights; and (iv) long-term continuation of economic subventions. (For 
        anyone
 interested in further details, the Belfast magazine Ulster Nation reviewed
 my small book on this topic back in 1995 (see
 http://www.ulsternation.org.uk/independence_for_n_ireland.htm). More
 recently, the online Belfast magazine The Blanket published several related
 articles by me, including: "The Whys and Hows of 'Independence for 
        Northern
 Ireland'" (http://lark.phoblacht.net/independence.html, 10 September 
        2001);
 "What do Republicans want?" (http://lark.phoblacht.net/republicanswant.html,
 3 March 2002); "Dissident Republicans: Rebels Without A Plan"
 (http://lark.phoblacht.net/withoutaplan.html, 17 April 2002); and "Reunion
 versus six-county independence" (http://lark.phoblacht.net/reunionvs.html,
 23 June 2002).)
 In a sense, though, constitutional "details" may be less critical 
        to theconcept of possible independence than would be the specifics of how an
 independence plan would be developed and how that plan would be tested 
        at
 the polls. Independence, if it ever happened, would have to be the product
 of joint efforts by the British and Irish governments later approved by 
        a
 supermajority (probably between 66 and 75 percent) of those voting in 
        an
 independence plebiscite in Northern Ireland. The following implementation
 steps might well be followed:
 1. The British and Irish governments would expressly ask Northern Irelandersto encourage their respective political representatives to take part in 
        a
 transparent constitutional convention presided over by outside
 constitutional experts.
 2. After a constitutional and financial package for independence has 
        beenapproved by Britain, the Republic, and the EU, and after adequate time 
        for
 public discussion, the British government would hold a simple-majority
 plebiscite in Northern Ireland on the following test-drive issue: "Do 
        you
 want to see a shadow election held to establish who would hold office 
        under
 this scheme if that scheme were later approved in a supermajority
 plebiscite?"
 3. If the majority did not want to take that test-drive, negotiatedindependence would be well proven to be inadequate and rightly abandoned.
 4. If the shadow election proposal did receive majority support, shadowofficials would then be chosen, but those officials would have few powers.
 Assuming that the proposed constitutional government were in the form 
        of a
 presidential system, the elected shadow president and shadow legislators
 would be empowered to select, in accordance with that system, an executive
 cabinet and members of the judiciary. The only other power they'd have 
        would
 be to convene themselves in their shadow positions; at least in theory, 
        they
 might convene to discuss whether to recommend voter approval of the ultimate
 supermajority plebiscite on the issue of Northern Ireland's negotiated
 independence.
 5. After some appropriate period of time following an approved shadowelection, the supermajority plebiscite would be held. Rejection thereof
 would entail abandonment of an independence approach. Acceptance thereof
 would trigger a transition period, likely to be subject to a final
 "condition precedent" of independently approved decommissioning, 
        whereupon
 the shadow members (executive, judicial, and legislative) of the government
 would be certified as official.
 Perhaps the most important point regarding this development/testing approachis this: at the final "supermajority plebiscite" stage, each 
        side would have
 the ability to veto any independence proposal. Therefore, approval of 
        an
 independence proposal could happen under this approach only if both sides
 decided broadly to support that proposal. If both did so, Northern Ireland
 would obtain - unlike as a result the Good Friday Agreement scheme - an
 honest, straightforward, fair, workable, and stable government, and her
 society as a whole would markedly improve.
 Should the GFA suffer an irremediable failure, the British and Irishgovernments will need to try to find another way forward. Surely one thing
 they might then try to do would be to use all the fudge, smoke, and mirrors
 at their disposal to launch into an effort ostensibly aimed at a
 "Sunningdale Mark III," perhaps hoping at least to buy another 
        six or eight
 years of relative peace while local politicians ritualistically march 
        up the
 Stormont hill and march down again. An alternative - something for them 
        to
 do before trying to repeat yet again the failures of the past - would 
        be to
 attempt a one-year-long formal examination of possible independence.
 A surmountable impediment to the British and Irish governments adopting 
        thisnew tack is the staunch, almost-universal reluctance of the "intelligentsia"
 in Ireland and Britain to take on the independence issue honestly. As 
        but
 one example thereof, I wrote the following, in a June 2002 edition of 
        The
 Blanket, regarding Republican writer Ciarán Irvine:
 To his credit, Mr. Irvine puts thought and effort into trying to address 
        theNorthern Ireland question. He does so, however, by proposing reunion, 
        which
 he sincerely wants but which Unionists have repeatedly rejected and which
 they disdain unto this day.
 Mr. Irvine might instead say something along the following lines: "I 
        wantreunion, and you Unionists want continued union. A theoretical middle 
        ground
 exists: six-county independence. Right now, I strongly think independence
 would not work, and I might in any event ultimately decide not to support
 it. However, the unarguable fact is that possible independence hasn't 
        yet
 been formally examined, and I'd be willing to help examine it now, in 
        good
 faith, if you would do so as well."
 Which of these two proposals does Mr. Irvine believe would have a greaterimpact on the Northern Ireland situation?
 Mr. Irvine's response to this squarely-put question was silence, perhapsbecause he did not want to admit aloud the obvious answer: while his
 advocating an independence inquiry might have only a small impact on the
 Northern Ireland situation, his hackneyed call for reunion will have, 
        and
 has had, none whatsoever.
 The Other View is published, I've been told, "by a group of former 
        loyalistand republican prisoners as part of a project designed to stimulate
 constructive dialogue between loyalists-unionists and
 republican-nationalists." Naturally, I wonder whether members of 
        that
 frontline group would publicly address a similar question hereby put to
 them.
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